Evolution of cooperation driven by social-welfare-based migration

Individuals' migration behavior may play a significant role in the evolution of cooperation. In reality, individuals' migration behavior may depend on their perceptions of social welfare. To study the relationship between social-welfare-based migration and the evolution of cooperation, we consider an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in which an individual's migration depends on social welfare but not on the individual's own payoff. By introducing three important social welfare functions (SWFs) that are commonly studied in social science, we find that social-welfare-based migration can promote cooperation under a wide range of parameter values. In addition, these three SWFs have different effects on cooperation, especially through the different spatial patterns formed by migration. Because the relative efficiency of the three SWFs will change if the parameter values are changed, we cannot determine which SWF is optimal for supporting cooperation. We also show that memory capacity, which is needed to evaluate individual welfare, may affect cooperation levels in opposite directions under different SWFs. Our work should be helpful for understanding the evolution of human cooperation and bridging the chasm between studies of social preferences and studies of social cooperation.