Somebody may scold you! A dictator experiment

• We study the role of observation and sanction on individual behavior.
• Observation is provided by introducing a third-party in a dictator game.
• Sanction is provided by means of a written feedback from the receiver in a dictator game.
• We show that observation alone has no effect on behavior.
• Observation with feedback increases the generosity of dictators.

In this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and observation with feedback from a third-party in a one-shot dictator game (DG). In addition to a baseline condition (DG), a third-party anonymous subject was introduced who either silently observed or observed and got to give feedback by choosing one of seven messages consisting of varying degree of (dis)satisfaction. We found that observation coupled with feedback increased significantly dictators’ propositions, while no significant effect is found for observation-only. We conclude that regard by others matters only if it linked to social factors such as communication. This complements the literature arguing that altruistic behavior is instrumental in serving other selfish (or non-purely altruistic) ends such as self-reputation or social approval. This experiment also contributes to the growing literature that aims at decreasing the artificiality of dictator game designs by increasing their practicability and external validity.