Walking the talk in multiparty bargaining: An experimental investigation

We study the framing effects of communication on payoffs in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving parties on a path toward or away from equal-division agreements. These endogenous framing effects may outweigh any overall social utility effects due to the mere presence of communication. In two studies, we find that non-binding talk about fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on Competitive Reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions. Our two studies allow us to demonstrate that manipulated pre-game talk and spontaneous within-game dialogue lead to the same results.

► We study the framing effects of communication on payoffs in multiparty bargaining.
► In two studies, talk about fairness leads toward off-equilibrium, equal payoffs.
► Talk about competitive reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions.
► Manipulated pregame talk and spontaneous within-game talk lead to the same results.