A defence of the welfarist account of enhancement

• The welfarist account of enhancement and its implications are presented.
• Objections against this account are argued to be either unfounded or addressable.
• This account offers a coherent, normative approach to thinking about enhancement.

How should we understand the concept of enhancement? One approach is to define it as referring to a change in a person's biology or psychology which increase their chances of leading a good life in the relevant set of circumstances. This welfarist account of enhancement posits itself as a normative approach that is more coherent than alternative definitions. However, a number of criticisms have been levelled against it, including that it obscures the distinction between science-based interventions (e.g. drugs) and so-called conventional ones (e.g. education), as well as the distinction between therapy and enhancement. It has also been objected to on the basis that it relies heavily on the contested concept of well-being, and that it underestimates the role social forces play in how we define well-being. I argue here that these criticisms are either unfounded or addressable. The welfarist account is a promising approach to conceptualizing enhancement, so long as we understand it only as definition of what enhancement is, as opposed to an argument for the permissibility of enhancement.