An integrative model of rational imitation in infancy

• There has been a vigorous debate about whether or not infants imitate rationally.
• The rational-imitation account and the two-stage model are reviewed.
• The two competing accounts have received empirical support from different domains.
• We suggest that both accounts operate on different levels and can be integrated.

It has been proposed that infants selectively imitate based on a rational evaluation of an observed action (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002). This rational-imitation account has been rejected based on findings which suggested that infant imitation depends on: (a) the similarity between the infant's and the model's body posture; and (b) the presence of action effects (Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, 2011). Despite this controversy, we show that both accounts have received empirical support from different fields of research. We propose that both accounts operate on different levels, and we present an integrative model, which combines the two seemingly competing accounts. Motor resonance is perceived as a mechanism that enables infants to imitate, and a rational evaluation of the model's action is conceived as a mechanism that guides infants’ imitative behavior.