کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
920476 920290 2008 4 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Methodological individualism in experimental games: Not so easily dismissed
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری علم عصب شناسی علوم اعصاب شناختی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Methodological individualism in experimental games: Not so easily dismissed
چکیده انگلیسی

Orthodox game theory and social preference models cannot explain why people cooperate in many experimental games or how they manage to coordinate their choices. The theory of evidential decision making provides a solution, based on the idea that people tend to project their own choices onto others, whatever these choices might be. Evidential decision making preserves methodological individualism, and it works without recourse to social preferences. Rejecting methodological individualism, team reasoning is a thinly disguised resurgence of the group mind fallacy, and the experiments reported by Colman et al. [Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Rose, J. (this issue). Collective rationality in interactive decisions: Evidence for team reasoning. Acta Psychologica, doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.08.003.] do not offer evidence that uniquely supports team reasoning.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Acta Psychologica - Volume 128, Issue 2, June 2008, Pages 398–401
نویسندگان
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