The evidence rejects the expertise hypothesis: Reply to Gauthier & Bukach

In Robbins, R. & McKone, E. (2006). No face-like processing for object-of-expertise in three behavioural tasks. Cognition this issue, we showed face-like holistic/configural processing does not occur for objects-of-expertise on standard paradigms including inversion, part-whole, part-in-configurally-transformed-whole, and the standard composite task. In this reply to the discussion by Gauthier, I., & Bukach, C. (2006). Should we reject the expertise hypothesis? Cognition, this issue, we focus on several issues: the fact that they do not dispute our review of previous data; the strength of null effects obtained from multiple studies and paradigms; the evidence for domain-specificity of the neural substrate supporting face processing; the difference between the expertise hypothesis (as a theory about the origin of face processing) and studies of how experience affects object processing in general; and the problems with G&B’s proposed alteration to the standard composite paradigm. We argue that overwhelming evidence suggests the expertise hypothesis should be put to rest so that researchers can focus on what the origin of “special” processing for faces actually is, and investigate the many interesting changes to object recognition that do occur with experience.