کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9547379 | 1370927 | 2005 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Corruption by monopoly: Bribery in Chinese enterprise licensing as a repeated bargaining game
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This article presents a structural analysis of corruption in Chinese enterprise licensing using a repeated bargaining model. I demonstrate that once relative bargaining powers are correctly accounted for, certain institutional features of the Chinese licensing system do lead to bribery as a robust outcome. Exercises in comparative statics then reveal that certain conventional anticorruption measures may have counterintuitive effects. Furthermore, the robustness of bribery is a direct result of licensing officials' monopolistic powers. If overlapping jurisdictions are introduced, the resulting bureaucratic competition would completely eliminate bribery in some cases and greatly reduce the size of the bribes in other cases.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: China Economic Review - Volume 16, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 171-188
Journal: China Economic Review - Volume 16, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 171-188
نویسندگان
David Da-hua YANG,