کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9553871 | 1375674 | 2005 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Real options, agency conflicts, and optimal capital structure
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We examine the impact of a stockholder-bondholder conflict over the timing of the exercise of an investment option on firm value and corporate financial policy. We find that an equity-maximizing firm exercises the option too early relative to a value-maximizing strategy, and we show how this problem can be characterized as one of overinvestment in risky investment projects. Equityholders' incentive to overinvest significantly decreases firm value and optimal leverage, and significantly increases the credit spread of risky debt. Numerical solutions illustrate how the agency cost of overinvestment and its effect on corporate financial policy vary with firm and project characteristics.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 29, Issue 6, June 2005, Pages 1405-1428
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 29, Issue 6, June 2005, Pages 1405-1428
نویسندگان
David C. Mauer, Sudipto Sarkar,