کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
956648 1478750 2014 28 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
یک تحلیل تعادل از حراج صعودی همزمان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی

We provide a Bayes–Nash equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) when local bidders interested in a single item compete against global bidders interested in aggregating many items. We first assume that each local bidder values only a specific item, e.g. the license for the region where it has monopoly power, and that global bidders' valuation functions are convex. For this environment we show that a global bidder faces an exposure problem with adverse consequences for revenue and efficiency. In the limit when the number of items grows large, the SAA is revenue and efficiency equivalent to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism. We extend our analysis to include the case where items are substitutes for local bidders, so that price arbitrage will occur as observed in many spectrum auctions. This environment, which combines substitutes and complements, results in an aggravated exposure problem. Consequently, the SAA is no longer efficient and may yield dramatically lower revenues than the VCG mechanism. Finally, we relax the assumption that global bidders' valuation functions are convex by considering an environment with medium-sized global bidders who demand fewer than all items. We show that global bidders divide the market at low prices when market sharing is feasible while they engage in mutually destructive bidding when there is a fitting problem. In both cases, the SAA again underperforms relative to the VCG mechanism.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 153, September 2014, Pages 506–533
نویسندگان
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