کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
956729 | 928487 | 2013 | 32 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We consider equilibrium timing decisions in a model with a large number of players and informational externalities. The players have private information about a common payoff parameter that determines the optimal time to invest. They learn from each other in real time by observing past investment decisions. We develop new methods of analysis for such large games, and we give a full characterization of symmetric equilibria. We show that the equilibrium statistical inferences are based on an exponential learning model. Although the beliefs converge to truth, learning takes place too late. Ex-ante welfare is strictly between that without observational learning and that with full information.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 6, November 2013, Pages 2404–2435
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 6, November 2013, Pages 2404–2435
نویسندگان
Pauli Murto, Juuso Välimäki,