کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
956736 | 928487 | 2013 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Global games are widely used to predict behaviour in games with strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria. We establish two results on the global game selection. First, we show that, for any supermodular complete information game, the global game selection is independent of the payoff functions chosen for the gameʼs global game embedding. Second, we give a simple sufficient criterion to derive the selection and establish noise independence in many-action games by decomposing them into games with smaller action sets, to which we may often apply simple criteria. We also report in which small games noise independence may be established by counting the number of players or actions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 6, November 2013, Pages 2620-2637
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 6, November 2013, Pages 2620-2637
نویسندگان
Christian Basteck, Tijmen R. Daniëls, Frank Heinemann,