کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
956756 | 928490 | 2013 | 35 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Risk-sharing and crises. Global games of regime change with endogenous wealth
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
I add heterogeneous agents and risk-sharing opportunities to a global game of regime change. The novel insight is that when there is a risk-sharing motive, fundamentals drive not only individual behavior, but also select which individuals are more relevant for the likelihood of a crisis because of endogenous shifts in wealth. If attacking is relatively safe, attack behavior in the global game and trade in state-contingent assets feed back into each other. This feedback implies that multiple equilibria may exist even if signal noise becomes arbitrarily small. In addition, heterogeneity in risk-aversion within the population amplifies the influence of the state of the economy on the probability of a crisis.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 4, July 2013, Pages 1624–1658
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 4, July 2013, Pages 1624–1658
نویسندگان
Rodolfo G. Campos,