کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
956776 | 928491 | 2013 | 31 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Banks as coordinators of economic growth and stability: Microfoundation for macroeconomy with externality
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Competition among banks promotes growth and stability for an economy with production externality. Following Arrow and Debreu (1954) [6], I formulate a standard growth model with externality—a two-period version of Romer (1986) [39]—as a game among consumers, firms, and intermediaries. The Walrasian equilibrium, with an auctioneer, does not achieve the social optimum. Without an auctioneer or intermediaries, I show that no Nash equilibrium exists. With several banks strategically intermediating capital, a Nash equilibrium emerges with a realistic institution, i.e., an interbank market with a negotiation process in the loan market. The equilibrium outcome is uniquely determined and socially optimal.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 1, January 2013, Pages 322–352
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 1, January 2013, Pages 322–352
نویسندگان
Kenichi Ueda,