کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
956836 928494 2015 15 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
نظارت بر هزینه، انگیزه های پویا و پیش فرض
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی

We study dynamic contracts between a lender and a borrower in the presence of costly state verification and hidden effort. We prove three results. Costly monitoring is employed by the lender to optimally limit history dependence and prevent future inefficient termination of the relationship. Due to interaction between costly monitoring and dynamic incentives, the probability of monitoring may fail to be monotone in the borrower's reservation utility. Finally, following the interpretation of the costly state verification literature, we distinguish two levels of bankruptcy: one associated with restructuring and the other with liquidation.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 159, Part A, September 2015, Pages 105–119
نویسندگان
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