کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
956874 | 928496 | 2010 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Testing the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We report experiments studying mixed strategy Nash equilibria that are theoretically stable or unstable under learning. The Time Average Shapley Polygon (TASP) predicts behavior in the unstable case. We study two versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors that include a fourth strategy, Dumb. The unique Nash equilibrium is identical in the two games, but the predicted frequency of Dumb is much higher in the game where the NE is stable. Consistent with TASP, the observed frequency of Dumb is lower and play is further from Nash in the high payoff unstable treatment. However, Dumb is played too frequently in all treatments.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 6, November 2010, Pages 2309-2331
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 6, November 2010, Pages 2309-2331
نویسندگان
Timothy N. Cason, Daniel Friedman, Ed Hopkins,