کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
956878 928496 2010 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
چکیده انگلیسی

I study a problem of repeated moral hazard where the effect of effort is persistent over time: each period's outcome distribution is a function of a geometrically distributed lag of past efforts. I show that when the utility of the agent is linear in effort, a simple rearrangement of terms in his lifetime utility translates this problem into a related standard repeated moral hazard. The solutions for consumption in the two problems are observationally equivalent, implying that the main properties of the optimal contract remain unchanged with persistence. For illustration, I present the computed solution of an example.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 6, November 2010, Pages 2412–2423
نویسندگان
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