کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
956930 928500 2013 24 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
چکیده انگلیسی

We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled out. In environments allowing small transfers of utility among agents, these two conditions are also sufficient.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 2, March 2013, Pages 424–447
نویسندگان
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