کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
956976 | 928502 | 2011 | 25 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper presents a principal-agent model in which the agent has imprecise beliefs. We model this situation formally by assuming the agentʼs preferences are incomplete as in Bewley (1986) [2]. In this setting, incentives must be robust to Knightian uncertainty. We study the implications of robustness for the form of the resulting optimal contracts. We give conditions under which there is a unique optimal contract, and show that it must have a simple flat payment plus bonus structure. That is, output levels are divided into two sets, and the optimal contract pays the same wage for all output levels in each set. We derive this result for the case in which the agentʼs utility function is linear and then show it also holds if this utility function has some limited curvature.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 146, Issue 3, May 2011, Pages 1148-1172
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 146, Issue 3, May 2011, Pages 1148-1172
نویسندگان
Giuseppe Lopomo, Luca Rigotti, Chris Shannon,