کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957084 | 928506 | 2007 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper examines an informed principal–agent game with ex post participation constraints for the agent. It shows that the players do not lose by communicating in turn among themselves rather than simultaneously if and only if the principal communicates first. It then considers every Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules that assign non-negative payoffs for one player in a bilateral asymmetric information framework. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for sequential communication to be as efficient as simultaneous communication in implementing these allocation rules when the player with unbounded payoffs moves first.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 137, Issue 1, November 2007, Pages 733–744
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 137, Issue 1, November 2007, Pages 733–744
نویسندگان
Stefan Ambec,