کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957164 | 928512 | 2011 | 27 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity](/preview/png/957164.png)
This paper introduces a notion of robustness to ambiguous beliefs for Bayesian Nash equilibria. An equilibrium is robust if the corresponding strategies remain approximately optimal for a class of games with ambiguous beliefs that results from an appropriately defined perturbation of the belief structure of the original non-ambiguous belief game. The robustness definition is based on a novel definition of equilibrium for games with ambiguous beliefs that requires equilibrium strategies to be approximate best responses for all measures that define a player's belief. Conditions are derived under which robustness is characterized by a newly defined strategic continuity property, which can be verified without reference to perturbations and corresponding ambiguous belief games.
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 146, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 248–274