کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957180 928513 2012 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Impermanent types and permanent reputations
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Impermanent types and permanent reputations
چکیده انگلیسی

We study the impact of unobservable stochastic replacements for the long-run player in the classical reputation model with a long-run player and a series of short-run players. We provide explicit lower bounds on the Nash equilibrium payoffs of a long-run player, both ex-ante and following any positive probability history. Under general conditions on the convergence rates of the discount factor to one and of the rate of replacement to zero, both bounds converge to the Stackelberg payoff if the type space is sufficiently rich. These limiting conditions hold in particular if the game is played very frequently.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 147, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 162–178
نویسندگان
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