کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957205 | 928514 | 2013 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Information acquisition during a Dutch auction
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction when the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation with a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in the setting where bidders are ex-ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that when the number of bidders is large the Dutch auction produces more revenue than the first price auction.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 3, May 2013, Pages 1213–1225
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 148, Issue 3, May 2013, Pages 1213–1225
نویسندگان
Paavo Miettinen,