کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957226 928515 2009 16 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Learning in games with unstable equilibria
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Learning in games with unstable equilibria
چکیده انگلیسی

We propose a new concept for the analysis of games, the TASP, which gives a precise prediction about non-equilibrium play in games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning. We show that, when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and so place greater weight on recent experience, the time average of play often converges in these “unstable” games, even while mixed strategies and beliefs continue to cycle. This time average, the TASP, is related to the cycle identified by Shapley [L.S. Shapley, Some topics in two person games, in: M. Dresher, et al. (Eds.), Advances in Game Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964]. The TASP can be close to or quite distinct from Nash equilibrium.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 144, Issue 4, July 2009, Pages 1694–1709
نویسندگان
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