کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957242 | 928516 | 2011 | 26 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Incentives and the structure of teams
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies the relationship between moral hazard and the matching structure of teams. We show that team incentive problems may generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities in the production technology. Second, we analyze how complementarity in the underlying technology affects the matching predictions arising due to moral hazard. We find that (i) even when the production technology is strongly complementary, the incentive problem may lead to formation of negatively sorted teams; (ii) as the degree of complementarity increases, the optimal matching structure may switch from positive to negative, solely due to the need to provide incentives.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 146, Issue 6, November 2011, Pages 2307-2332
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 146, Issue 6, November 2011, Pages 2307-2332
نویسندگان
April Mitchell Franco, Matthew Mitchell, Galina Vereshchagina,