کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957290 | 928519 | 2012 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Social discounting and incentive compatible fiscal policy
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper considers a representative agent model of linear capital and labor income taxation in which the government cannot commit ex-ante to a sequence of policies for the future. In this setup, if the government is more impatient than the households, the capital income tax will be positive in steady state. Thus, impatience and lack of commitment are able to generate positive capital taxes in the long run, although each of these characteristics individually was not. Furthermore, the steady state to which the economy converges is independent of initial conditions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 147, Issue 6, November 2012, Pages 2469–2482
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 147, Issue 6, November 2012, Pages 2469–2482
نویسندگان
Catarina Reis,