کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957324 | 928522 | 2009 | 31 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله

چکیده انگلیسی
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on equilibrium payoffs and estimate strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring. We find that subjects' payoffs (i) decrease as noise increases, and (ii) are lower than the theoretical maximum for low noise, but exceed it for high noise. Under the assumption that the subjects' strategy uses thresholds on the public signal for transition between cooperation and punishment states, we find that the best fitting strategy simply compares the most recent public signal against a single threshold.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 144, Issue 3, May 2009, Pages 1135–1165
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 144, Issue 3, May 2009, Pages 1135–1165
نویسندگان
Masaki Aoyagi, Guillaume Fréchette,