کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957348 928523 2007 24 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In addition, general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of contracting with imperfect commitment: First, they allow us to identify the ‘local downward’ incentive constraints as the relevant ones if the agent's preferences satisfy a single-crossing property. Second, we show how one may restrict the cardinality of the message spaces of the communication device. An example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality of one-shot, direct communication.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 136, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 236–259
نویسندگان
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