کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957349 | 928523 | 2007 | 26 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information](/preview/png/957349.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms. Blocking is organized at the interim stage by an incentive-compatible mediation plan. Membership of the blocking coalition itself may be determined randomly by the blocking mediator. Nonemptiness of an interim fine core is proven for games with a balanced structure, independent types, and sidepayments. An offer of severance payments may be needed to inhibit blocking. Core allocations are characterized in terms of virtual-utility scales that generalize the weighted-utility scales of the inner core. Mechanisms that achieve core allocations are coalitionally durable.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 136, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 260–285
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 136, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 260–285
نویسندگان
Roger B. Myerson,