کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957351 928523 2007 22 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
چکیده انگلیسی

We study collusion in an IPV auction with binary type spaces. Collusion is organized by a third party that can manipulate participation decisions. We characterize the optimal response of the seller to different threats of collusion among the bidders. We show that, contrary to the prevailing view that asymmetric information imposes transaction costs in side contracting, collusion in the optimal auction is efficient when the third party can implement monetary transfers as well as when it can implement monetary transfers and reallocations of the good. The threat of non-participation in the auction by a subset of bidders is crucial in constraining the seller's profit.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 136, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 302–323
نویسندگان
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