کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957374 | 928523 | 2007 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
A famous solution for cooperative transferable utility games is the Shapley value. Most axiomatic characterizations of this value use some axiom related to null players, i.e. players who contribute zero to any coalition. We show that replacing null players with nullifying players characterizes the equal division solution distributing the worth of the 'grand coalition' equally among all players. A player is nullifying if every coalition containing this player earns zero worth. Using invariance we provide similar characterizations of the equal surplus division solution assigning to every player its own worth, and distributing the remaining surplus equally among all players.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 136, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 767-775
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 136, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 767-775
نویسندگان
René van den Brink,