کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957425 | 928526 | 2010 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: Theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) [18] implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopolies, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome. We show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in costs, since every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the Walrasian outcome is a good predictor of market outcomes. Finally, we suggest a new theory based on a mix of imitation and other learning processes that explains subjects' behavior fairly well.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 5, September 2010, Pages 1603–1617
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 5, September 2010, Pages 1603–1617
نویسندگان
Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck, Jörg Oechssler, Simon Weidenholzer,