کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957448 | 928527 | 2008 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Informal insurance in social networks
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Informal insurance in social networks Informal insurance in social networks](/preview/png/957448.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals. While transfers are based on social norms, individuals must have the incentive to comply. We investigate the structure of self-enforcing insurance networks. Network links play two distinct and possibly conflictual roles. They act as conduits for both transfers and information; affecting the scope for insurance and the severity of punishments upon noncompliance. Their interaction leads to a characterization of stable networks as suitably “sparse” networks. Thickly and thinly connected networks tend to be stable, whereas intermediate degrees of connectedness jeopardize stability. Finally, we discuss the effect of discounting on stability.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 143, Issue 1, November 2008, Pages 36–58
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 143, Issue 1, November 2008, Pages 36–58
نویسندگان
Francis Bloch, Garance Genicot, Debraj Ray,