کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957523 | 928532 | 2007 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria](/preview/png/957523.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
Cheap talk is shown to facilitate coordination on the unique efficient equilibrium in experimental order-statistic games. This result is roughly consistent with theoretical predictions according to which cheap talk promotes efficient Nash play. The evidence concerning the mechanisms that theory appeals to is mixed: Frequent agreement of messages and actions is consistent with messages being viewed as self-committing. Risk in the underlying game and the absence of self-signaling messages may explain why message profiles are not unanimous. Time-varying message profiles can be interpreted as evidence for players trying to negotiate equilibria and/or trying to rely on secret handshakes.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 132, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 274–290
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 132, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 274–290
نویسندگان
Andreas Blume, Andreas Ortmann,