کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957531 | 928532 | 2007 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the n-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 132, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 461–473
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 132, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 461–473
نویسندگان
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine,