کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957554 | 928533 | 2010 | 32 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Overcoming the coordination problem: Dynamic formation of networks
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze a multi-period entry game among privately informed agents who differ with respect to the number of agents who must enter in order for their own entry to be profitable. In each period agents who have not yet joined decide whether to subscribe to a network. There exists a unique equilibrium that approximates any symmetric equilibrium arbitrarily closely as the discount factor approaches one. This resolves the coordination problem. Ex-post efficiency is necessarily achieved asymptotically as the population size grows large. These results do not hold if subscribers can reverse their decisions without cost.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 2, March 2010, Pages 689-720
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 2, March 2010, Pages 689-720
نویسندگان
Jack Ochs, In-Uck Park,