کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957555 | 928533 | 2010 | 31 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Informational control and organizational design
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Informational control and organizational design Informational control and organizational design](/preview/png/957555.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper focuses on issues of allocating authority between an uninformed principal and an informed expert. We analyze the benefits of informational control—restricting the precision of the expert's information (without learning its content). In this case, the result of Dessein (2002) [8] that delegating decisions to a perfectly informed expert is better than communication when preferences between the expert and the principal are not too far apart is reversed. We demonstrate that these organizational forms—informational control and delegation—can be either complements or substitutes, depending on the principal's ability to affect the expert's discretion about the set of allowed policies.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 2, March 2010, Pages 721–751
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 2, March 2010, Pages 721–751
نویسندگان
Maxim Ivanov,