کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957588 | 928535 | 2010 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
The probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001 [9]) is ordinally efficient but not strategy-proof. We study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large assignment problems. We establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a given expected utility function, if there are sufficiently many copies of each object type, then reporting ordinal preferences truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent (regardless of the number of other agents and their preferences). The non-manipulability and the ordinal efficiency of the probabilistic serial mechanism support its implementation instead of random serial dictatorship in large assignment problems.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 106-123
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 106-123
نویسندگان
Fuhito Kojima, Mihai Manea,