کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957591 | 928535 | 2010 | 27 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The paper focuses on the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as the continuation probability approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit of the equilibrium proposals as the generalized fixed point of the decumulative distribution of the players' ideal points as induced by the recognition probabilities. In contrast to the existing literature, we find no general relationship between the limit equilibrium proposals and either the Nash bargaining solution or the median voter outcome.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 189–215
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 189–215
نویسندگان
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski,