کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957593 | 928535 | 2010 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium on universal type spaces for supermodular games
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We prove the existence of a greatest and a least interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium for supermodular games of incomplete information. There are two main differences from the earlier proofs and from general existence results for non-supermodular Bayesian games: (a) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian game, in which each player's beliefs are part of his or her type rather than being derived from a prior; (b) we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which each player and every type (rather than almost every type) chooses a best response to the strategy profile of the other players. There are no restrictions on type spaces and action sets may be any compact metric lattices.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 249–263
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 249–263
نویسندگان
Timothy Van Zandt,