کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957607 | 928538 | 2006 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Pillage and property
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Pillage and property Pillage and property](/preview/png/957607.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper introduces a class of coalitional games, called pillage games, as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. Any coalition can pillage, costlessly and with certainty, any less powerful coalition. Power is endogenous, so a pillage game does not have a characteristic function, but pillage provides a domination concept that defines a stable set, which represents an endogenous balance of power. Every stable set contains only finitely many allocations, and can be represented as a farsighted core. Additional results are obtained for particular games, including the game in which the power of each coalition is determined by its total wealth.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 131, Issue 1, November 2006, Pages 26–44
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 131, Issue 1, November 2006, Pages 26–44
نویسندگان
J.S. Jordan,