کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957613 928538 2006 33 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Private monitoring in auctions
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Private monitoring in auctions
چکیده انگلیسی

We study infinitely repeated first-price auctions in which a bidder only learns whether or not he won the object. While repetition of the stage-game equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium in public strategies, with patient bidders there are simple Nash equilibria in private strategies that improve on bid rotation. Sequential rationality is appropriately captured by essentially perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE), which ignores behavior after irrelevant histories. Our main result is the construction of EPBEa that improve upon bid rotation. Assuming symmetry, the exclusionary schemes of Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [Tacit collusion in repeated auctions, J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004), 153–169], including asymptotically efficient ones, are supported as EPBEa.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 131, Issue 1, November 2006, Pages 179–211
نویسندگان
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