کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957633 | 928539 | 2008 | 26 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Uncertainty, co-ordination and path dependence
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Our objective is to assess whether dynamics hinder or assist co-ordination in a game with strategic complementarities. We study two dynamic aspects: different agents make decisions at different points in time; and extra information about a payoff-relevant state of nature becomes available over time. We find that the dynamic resolution of information matters most for uniqueness of equilibrium. This is demonstrated by showing that the condition for uniqueness is weaker when learning occurs. We also analyse how successfully agents co-ordinate when there is a unique equilibrium. Finally, we show that path dependence occurs: the order in which signals arrive matters, as well as the total amount of information received.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 138, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 262–287
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 138, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 262–287
نویسندگان
In Ho Lee, Robin Mason,