کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957681 | 1478755 | 2008 | 36 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus](/preview/png/957681.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanisms. We show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents' type profiles satisfies two conditions: the well-known condition of Crémer and McLean [1988. Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 56, 1247-1257] and the Identifiability condition introduced in this paper. We also show that these conditions are necessary for ex-post efficiency to be attainable with budget balance and individual rationality, and that the expected social surplus in these mechanisms can be distributed in any desirable way. Lastly, we demonstrate that, like Crémer-McLean condition, the Identifiability condition is generic if there are at least three agents.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 140, Issue 1, May 2008, Pages 126-161
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 140, Issue 1, May 2008, Pages 126-161
نویسندگان
Grigory Kosenok, Sergei Severinov,