کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957727 928556 2007 4 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions
چکیده انگلیسی

In a recent paper, Peters [Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency, J. Econ. Theory 111 (2003) 189–228] identifies a set of restrictions on players’ preferences, called “no-externalities assumption”, under which, in common agency games, there is no loss of generality in restricting principals’ strategies to be take-it or leave-it offers. The present note provides an example to show that these conditions are not sufficient when the agent takes a non-contractible action.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 135, Issue 1, July 2007, Pages 590–593
نویسندگان
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