کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957733 928560 2007 32 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. For independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values, the paper identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders’ payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 134, Issue 1, May 2007, Pages 61–92
نویسندگان
,