کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957787 | 928573 | 2006 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games](/preview/png/957787.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
In perfect foresight dynamics, an action is linearly stable if expectation that people will always choose the action is self-fulfilling. A symmetric game is a PIM game if an opponent's particular action maximizes the incentive of an action, independently of the rest of the players. This class includes supermodular games, games with linear incentives and so forth. We show that, in PIM games, linear stability is equivalent to u-dominance, a generalization of risk-dominance, and that there is no path escaping a u-dominant equilibrium. Existing results on N-player coordination games, games with linear incentives and two-player games are obtained as corollaries.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 128, Issue 1, May 2006, Pages 255–273
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 128, Issue 1, May 2006, Pages 255–273
نویسندگان
Fuhito Kojima,