کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
958087 | 928862 | 2010 | 34 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A few bad apples: An analysis of CEO performance pay and firm productivity
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
استراتژی و مدیریت استراتژیک
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چکیده انگلیسی
We investigate the relationship between CEO performance pay incentives and firm productivity. In general, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between productivity and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to share value (delta) and a positive relationship between productivity and the sensitivity of CEO option wealth to stock return volatility (vega). Thus, a high delta associated with CEO risk-aversion lowers productivity, but a high vega from stock options offsets this effect. In looking at delta and vega jointly, we also find that options do not always achieve their intended purpose. These results are stronger among firms that are weakly governed or when high transaction costs prevent the writing of an optimal compensation contract.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economics and Business - Volume 62, Issue 4, July–August 2010, Pages 273–306
Journal: Journal of Economics and Business - Volume 62, Issue 4, July–August 2010, Pages 273–306
نویسندگان
Laarni Bulan, Paroma Sanyal, Zhipeng Yan,