کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
960356 | 929445 | 2007 | 29 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper shows that classified boards destroy value by entrenching management and reducing director effectiveness. First, I show that classified boards are associated with a significant reduction in firm value and that this holds even among complex firms, although such firms are often regarded as most likely to benefit from staggered board elections. I then examine how classified boards entrench management by focusing on CEO turnover, executive compensation, proxy contests, and shareholder proposals. My results indicate that classified boards significantly insulate management from market discipline, thus suggesting that the observed reduction in value is due to managerial entrenchment and diminished board accountability.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 83, Issue 2, February 2007, Pages 501–529
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 83, Issue 2, February 2007, Pages 501–529
نویسندگان
Olubunmi Faleye,