کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
961553 | 929869 | 2011 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The effects of hospitals' governance on optimal contracts: Bargaining vs. contracting
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم پزشکی و سلامت
پزشکی و دندانپزشکی
سیاست های بهداشت و سلامت عمومی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We propose a two-stage model to study the impact of different hospitals' governance frameworks on the optimal contracts designed by third-party payers when patients' disease severity is the private information of the hospital. In the second stage, doctors and managers interact within either a bargaining or a contracting scenario. In the contracting scenario, managers offer a contract that determines the payment to doctors, and doctors decide how many patients to treat. In the bargaining scenario, doctors and managers strategically negotiate on both the payment to doctors and the number of patients to treat. We derive the equilibrium doctors' payments and number of treated patients under both scenarios. We then derive the optimal contract offered by the government to the hospital in the first stage. Results show that when the cost of capital is sufficiently low, the informational rent is lower, and the social welfare is higher, in the contracting scenario.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Health Economics - Volume 30, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 408-424
Journal: Journal of Health Economics - Volume 30, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 408-424
نویسندگان
Matteo M. Galizzi, Marisa Miraldo,